viernes, junio 03, 2005

Countdown to Disengagement

We are now two months in advance of the implementation of the pullout from Gaza, designed by Ariel Sharon and his ministers. So, before the beginning of the summer of disengagement, here is my analysis of the goals and consequences of the plan, that I strongly and sadly support.

The Sharon plan is no more than a revival of Barak´s post-intifada long-term strategy: the maximum-Jews/minimum-Arabs framework, based on total isolation from the big Palestinian population centers and the building of a wall between proper Israel and the territories, including inside the heavily populated settlement blocs in the West Bank and leaving outside no Jewish population at all. The military occupation will be kept before the final status agreement but the settlement project will be frozen inside the Wall and will advance outside. After the Arafat-driven collapse of Camp David II peace negotiations, Barak´s political capital was exactly zero, so his long term strategy fell into oblivion, up to the point when Sharon decided to come back into the only realistic short term approach to the management (not resolution) of the Israel-Arab conflict.

The first misunderstanding about disengagement is related to its ends. The disengagement is not a part of the peace process, nor a part of the failed Quartet’s Road Map. Disengagement is a military move, related to a more general military-demographic strategy, so it shouldn’t be understood in political terms. It can lead to politics, but its success doesn’t depend on Palestinian partnership. The time for politics has been over since 2000 revival of genocidal Islamo-fascism. Mazen is no more than a weakened Arafat.

On political terms, the disengagement will have costs. After its perceived victory over Israel, the Palestinian fascists will try to go further in their terrorist strategy, and Hamas will be strengthened by the total control of the Gaza Strip. Mazen knows that Hamas is no longer the military puppet of Fatath, and he has patriotically (no irony here) accepted his role as the diplomatic branch of Hamas.

But the Lebanon experience has taught the Israelis that borders can be defended against terrorism. Don’t make a mistake here: walls are a classic development in all conflicts between civilization and barbarism: the Chinese, the Romans, the French in 1940 and over all, the Byzantines have fought for years against an fanatic or powerful barbarian raising walls and, as you can check in the latter examples, the result has been always total defeat. Walls don’t win wars. But Israel is not building a military wall and IDF is still a mobile army. This wall is built to prevent infiltration, both for terror and immigration.

As a general rule, coexistence of a modern Muslim majority with a civilized people is not sustainable. In Western Europe, the Muslims have expanded their population massively, creating a ghetto culture, in such a way that there are several hundred Muslim enclaves on France where sharia rules de facto. Of course there are encouraging signs of Muslim youths becoming clearly westernized, but at the moment the ability of Muslims to go for a secular and individualist lifestyle remains an open issue. Being a minority, we cannot say Muslims are a problem, but we should recognize that they are a risk.

Being a majority, the idea that Arabs and Jews can share the land is utopical and self-defective. As long as Israel is part of the Western civilization, as long as the work-and-personal-freedom ethics is the moral basis of the Jewish people, the Israelis will be unable to share a territory with the barbarism of modern Islam. There is no possibility that the abyss of repression, misogyny and hierarchical hysteria that modern Islam means, can live side by side with a free and rich society; daily abuse, social disorder and political extremism are the only possible result of the mix. As a result, pushing step by step in form of mafias and using their increasing political power, the Arabs will be able to move the Jewish population in the same way as the Muslim Lebanese have been able to get rid of the Christians. Perhaps the ultra-orthodox are the only ones that can stand against the Muslims in this daily nightmare that Israel would became under the binational state. Places as Ashkelon are good pieces of evidence to proof the impossibility of multiculturalism when barbarians are a majority. The spillovers of modern Islam are, at the moment, unaffordable. The organic violence of a modern Islamic society can only be deterred by borders. These two peoples, in the current state of their development should be separated. Nobody wants Arab neighbors. Specially if they are a ruling majority.
In Gaza, Judea and Samaria, the Arab and Jewish communities are living side by side, in a territorial mixture, with no borders and no option for clear and lasting separation. If Israel includes Hebron, it will have to include Ramallah; if it includes Gush Katif, Gaza will be included too. And Gaza and Ramallah are inhabited lands, with inhabitants YOU DON´T WANNA LIVE WITH, and you can’t get rid of.

So, there is not choice for Israel; in the long run, the Great Israel project will became an apartheid society or an Arab state. The few thousand Jews living among a few millions of Arabs are a link to the Arab population. So they are a threat for Jewish (or even civilized) life in Israel. Israel is disengaging not from Gaza, but from the Arabs. Do you know any way to disengage from the Arabs without disengaging from Gaza?

After disengagement, life in Gaza will become even worse than it is now; a Hamastan with strict and revolutionary Islamism will be the outcome of the civil war that will develop after the end of occupation. The Islamist will try to use their new operational basis to fight against Israel. They will try, but once there is not Netzarim or Gush Katif, their available targets will be significantly reduced. The plan will increase their willingness to keep on terror, but it will reduce their ability to carry out the attacks. And with a clear and territorial enemy, retaliation becomes more acceptable. More marketable. If they keep the war after withdrawal, then reprisals are no longer part of occupation, but part of war. Hezbollah stays in control of Southern Lebanon, but now they have not easy targets, but difficult borders, and they rule a country where they have territorial interests, which makes deterrence possible.

In this game between organic barbarism and civilization, borders are the optimal strategy of civilized peoples. The superior Israeli technology and the ability for targeted retaliation and conventional war give the Israelis advantage in any conflict where territory is clear. Infiltration, organic violence, perversion of democracy, and raw massive reproduction are the weapons of the enemy. So keep them away and they became a hopeless crowd of hungry fanatics. Let them approach, and you will become a dhimmini or an exiled in one generation.
Gaza plan cannot be the end. The wall should be finished as soon as possible. Some land swaps should be enforced in the borders of the West Bank. Some mutual Arab and Jewish transfers should be implemented. The big blocs will remain on Israel. The rest should be left. And, of course, occupation shouldn’t finish without a final treaty. It is a military buffer and a bargaining chip. With clear borders, and no settlements beyond, the Israelis and Palestinians can go for negotiations. No interest will remain on Israel to keep the West Bank and no hope will be left to Palestinians once terror becomes impossible. So incentives for faithful negotiations will be finally established.

Peace is never built on good intentions but on solid interests. So the real peace process should begin before the nominal one, creating the necessary conditions and incentives. This is the historical job of Ariel Sharon, and so far, he is performing admirably.

PD.- He escrito este post pensando en la blogesfera anglo-parlante judía, así que espero que me disculpeis este cambio de idioma, que en todo caso es transitorio.


At 9:25 p. m., Anonymous Anónimo said...

Ahora que me había aficionado a tu bitácora...Es broma. El inglés no es mi fuerte asique el problema es mío. Es un déficit formativo que espero colmar en cuanto acabe la carrera. Esperare a los siguientes post que escribas.
Los otros días leí los post de capitalismo financiero y los de la UE y eran muy buenos. Se nota que en materia financiera estas muy puesto.
Pues saludos y mucho éxito con la comunidad anglo-parlante.


At 9:48 p. m., Blogger Wonka said...

La blogosfera hispanoparlante también agradece esta anotación. Independientemente de tu juicio sobre el Islam moderno, que no hay por qué compartir (aunque yo tiendo a hacerlo), es muy interesante tu argumento acerca de que a Israel le conviene una guerra convencional y no una de guerrillas, terrorismo o partisanos (Carl Schmitt), y por eso tiene que delimitar claramente las fronteras. Es decir, no están dejando al enemigo que defina la situación, sino que la están definiendo ellos. Muy, muy lúcido, Kantor.

At 12:37 p. m., Blogger Marzo said...

Uno de esos artículos que te explican cosas. Excelente.

(Por cierto, Kantor: si tu email es el que aparece en, tienes un mensaje).

At 12:50 p. m., Blogger Cosmic X said...

1) The area of Gush Katif (Southern Gaza Strip) is sparsely populated with Arabs. No real gain by evacuating these settlements.

2) All the military professionals in Israel (Shabak - Tzahal) have warned that disengagement will weaken Israel militarily. A similar thing happened before the implementation of the Oslo Accords but the goverment chose to ignore these warnings.

3) "Places as Askhelon are good pieces of evidence to proof the impossibility of multiculturalism when barbarians are a majority."
What in the world are you talking about? Ashkelon is a Jewish city in pre-1967 Israel!

4) "If Israel includes Hebron, it will have to include Ramallah; if it includes Gush Katif, Gaza will be included too."

Not true at all. Why do I have the feeling that you are unfamiliar with Israeli geography?

5) "The Islamist will try to use their new operational basis to fight against Israel. They will try, but once there is not Netzarim or Gush Katif, their available targets will be significantly reduced."

No they won't. They will strike within Israel proper.

6) "But the Lebanon experience has taught the Israelis that borders can be defended against terrorism."

We've already had several casualties from Lebanon since the withdrawal. The IDF is afraid to retalliate agaisnt Hezbollah attacks because thosands of Hezbollah rockets poised on the border hold Northern Israel hostage. The retreat from Lebanon is widely accredited with inspiring the current wave of violence.

7) "Don’t make a mistake here: walls are a classic development in all conflicts between civilization and barbarism: the Chinese, the Romans, the French in 1940..."

As you mentioned he Maginot Line of the French in 1940 was a dismal failure. And closer to home the Bar-Lev line in the Sinai was also a dismal failure.

8) "Some mutual Arab and Jewish transfers should be implemented. The big blocs will remain on Israel. The rest should be left. And, of course, occupation shouldn’t finish without a final treaty."

If you think that the Arabs will agree to mutual transfers then why do a unilateral transfer?

In conclusion: We have problems here in Israel withour Arab neighbors. Disengagement will only worsen them.

At 1:25 p. m., Blogger Kantor said...

"Places as Askhelon are good pieces of evidence to proof the impossibility of multiculturalism when barbarians are a majority."

The Arab increased population in Askhelon increased dramatically in the last years, and with them, the security problems related. Last year Haarezt published an article about lots of cases of harrasement aginst Jewish women, sharp increase on criminality, and urban degradation. The tipical "Marsella guetto process" that you can see in some areas of every european city. Under the binational state, police would be on THEIR side.

At 1:27 p. m., Blogger Kantor said...

"We've already had several casualties from Lebanon since the withdrawal."
How many?

"The IDF is afraid to retalliate agaisnt Hezbollah attacks because thosands of Hezbollah rockets poised on the border hold Northern Israel hostage"

Hezbollah is more afraid. So far, there are not Israeli hostages in Southern Lebanon.(I don´t think Arad is there)

At 1:28 p. m., Blogger Kantor said...

No they won't. They will strike within Israel proper.

How many people the Kassams had killed by now?

At 1:30 p. m., Blogger Kantor said...

"If you think that the Arabs will agree to mutual transfers then why do a unilateral transfer?"

I am not speaking about AGREMENTS. I am speaking about ARAB transfers. Of course, enforced!

At 10:14 a. m., Blogger Cosmic X said...


The following from jpost

"Since the completion of the pullout in the early hours of May 24, 2000, 20 Israelis – 14 soldiers and six civilians – have been killed in infiltrations, roadside bombings and cross-border shelling, and scores of people have been wounded, several of them seriously."

"The [Israeli] withdrawal has brought us relative peace and quiet for the past five years, but it has also created a problem because of the strategic threat posed by Hizbullah," he said.

"Hizbullah has more than 10,000 rockets and missiles, as well as artillery, mortars and other weapons, and it is holding northern communities and those farther to the south hostage by threatening to use these armaments.

"When the IDF withdrew from south Lebanon it meant abandoning the border to a terrorist organization that receives its instructions from Iran and Syria.

Read the whole article to get a more complete picture of the results of the withdrawal.

With regards to Ashkelon: I googled it and I see that there is a problem with Arab workers that spend the night in Ashkelon. I understand that they are not living there.

I don't know how many casualties have been caused by the Kassams. We have had A LOT of miracles here. The minute that the IDF stops patrolling the Egyptian border anything and everything will be smuggled into Gaza.

If you think that we can transfer Arabs against their will then let's just transfer them all out of here!

At 10:03 p. m., Blogger Kantor said...

A transfer of millions would be not only imposible, but also morally unacceptable.

A few thousands in both directions can be implemented.

At 10:09 p. m., Blogger Kantor said...

Gracias Marzo, por las sugerencias

At 11:27 p. m., Blogger opensoc said...

Los contenidos de este blog son una apertura inteligente a diversos temas, a cual mas interesante y actual. El analisis de Kantor sobre el 'disengagement', la puntualizacion de Wonka, e incluso la refutacion de Cosmicx , con sus puntos de vista divergentes, se complementan para brindar una visión mas abarcativa de los problemas que enfrenta Israel.
Gracias, Kantor ! es mas cómodo leerle aquí que en el blog de Arcadi, donde hay que saltear algunos posts tòxicos como los de shylock y mil y uno intrascendentes.
una pregunta inconexa, pero que mueve mi curiosidad: desde dónde escribe ¿ España, Israel, USA ?
¡una versión en positivo del judio de Henry Ford!

At 11:45 p. m., Blogger Jose Antonio said...

Obviamente la 'desconexión' es un movimiento político con varios objetivos como desprenderse de un territorio que a nivel de futuras negociaciones no contaría en posibles intercambios, desprenderse de una zona demograficamente imposible y dejar una 'patata caliente al liderazgo palestino'.

Si este se muestra tal como hasta ahora o bien Hamas toma el control o pronto los hombres del Fatah tratarán de reafirmar su autoridad contra los islamistas con lo que ello representaría.

Además del tema de su futuro económico general (en el que nuevamente tendrán considerables ayudas)existe el de la supervivencia o conversión de los milicianos en "tiempos de paz" y el peligro evidente de su posible insatisfacción y conversión en gangs delictivos, lo cual en Nablus, Belem y otras zonas ya lo son.

Creo que a todos los grupos palestino les interesa una 'transicción tranquila' pero dudo que haya recompensa para todos.

El grupo mayoritario, Fatah esta en plena descomposición e Israel debe tener muy en cuenta que ante una crisis inevitable en el campo palestino su única salida unificadora sera la lucha contra Israel (el incremento armamentístico
tendrá ahora dos objetivos, la posible lucha interna y la dirigida contra Israel).

Israel deberá mantener una actitud muy atenta y poco dada a los efectismos europeos (propios para unas sociedades occidentales) y estar vigilantes con los modelos postsionistas de las elites ashkenazies, cansadas del conflicto y deseosas de dar siempre 'algo más' para conjurar los problemas e influidas por la doctrina masoquista que impera en las sociedades occidentales.

Es fundamental no caer en la opción de tratar de asimilarse con la cultura regional, con el pretexto de una mejor acogida, idea utópica por antonomasia, sino reforzar su implicación con el mundo occidental (pese a sus horas bajas y el masoquismo decadente europeo).

Y por supuesto estar presto a ser nuevamente el malo de esta historia
para las 'bellas almas' europeas.

At 2:10 a. m., Blogger opensoc said...

Dershowitz: Treat Returning Settlers as Heroes - by Dan Izenberg

Harvard law professor Alan Dershowitz said during a visit to Israel that the Jewish settlers in the Gaza Strip "ought to be treated with extreme deference and they ought to be told they are heroes of Israel. They were heroes when they went and they are heroes when they are returning. They served in the front lines." Dershowitz added that it was the "state's prerogative to make territorial decisions and to make existential decisions about boundaries and peace." (Jerusalem Post)

At 3:04 a. m., Blogger opensoc said...

La salida de Gaza es una renuncia constructiva encarada con tristeza y determinación,, dice el hijo de Chaim Herzog, ( ex presidente de Israel), que muestra la fortaleza de la nación judia.
Vale la pena leer !

At 1:52 p. m., Anonymous Anónimo said...

I saw this on a blogger's website when googling, at the same time as finding yours.

At 2:25 a. m., Anonymous opensoc said...

¿Sería así la estrategia detrás de la desconexion?

The Disengagement and the Palestinians
By Gershon Baskin, Ph.D. August 8, 2005

There is no doubt that the Israeli disengagement has created some serious dilemmas and problems for the Palestinians. First, this is a unilateral step by Israel designed at a time when Israel declared that there was no partner. It was launched by Sharon to take attention away from Geneva and a much wider internationally supported campaign for Israeli-Palestinian peace. Sharon has claimed a space in the international community as a political hero, previously perceived there as a demon. Now leaders from the entire world are waiting on line to meet him.

Despite the international support that Sharon has received, the disengagement is perceived by most people as an attempt by Sharon to give away Gaza in order to tighten his grip on the West Bank. It is not clear if Gaza will really be detached from Israel -- whether Palestinians will be able to move freely between Gaza and the West Bank -- between the two parts of Palestine which are legally perceived to be one integrative territory. It is not clear if Israel will withdraw from the Gaza-Egypt border, whether a seaport will be allowed to function, whether the Gaza airport will be allowed to work, and many other open questions.

In the north of the West Bank it is unclear if Israel will turn over the vacated territory, roughly 2.5 times the size of Gaza, to the Palestinian Authority, transforming it into area "a" and under full Palestinian control, or if Israel will continue to hold full control and prevent Palestinians from moving freely in the area.

For the sake of argument, or for strategic game-playing, let us assume for a moment that Israel will completely withdraw from Gaza and that they will relinquish all control over Gaza, its international borders, its airspace, its land and it natural resources. If that is the case, Israel will claim that the occupation over Gaza has ended. At that point, a vacuum of sovereignty will exist, and while Israel was never be sovereign over Gaza, the question must be raised of whether or not the Palestinian Authority becomes the sovereign power and if that sovereignty is translated into statehood.

There is no need to declare a Palestinian State, that was done on November 15, 1988 and more than 100 countries recognized that state. Of those who did not recognize the State were all of the original 13 EU countries, the United States, Canada and Israel. The Palestinians could re-issue their Declaration of Independence, adding a chapter on borders indicating that the borders of the State are the West Bank, Gaza and East Jerusalem as the Capital of Palestine. A declaration as such would in fact be helpful to any future peace process. It sets in stone, so to speak, the price of peace that Israel must pay and it removes any doubts about Palestinian plans for expanding the State into Israeli territory.

Palestine must then gain full membership in the United Nations and Mahmoud Abbas should call on Israel to recognize the State of Palestine and even co-sponsor the resolution for UN Membership. If Israel did recognize the new State, there is no doubt that the United States would as well. Even without Israeli recognition, there is a chance that the United States would, and even without U.S. recognition, the rest of the world would recognize Palestine and establish embassies in a provisional capital.

In the Twelfth Session of the Palestine National Council in Cairo in 1974, a resolution was passed stating that the Palestinians would establish their state in any part of Palestine liberated from Israel. After 1974 this became the policy of the mainstream of the Palestinian National Movement. If Gaza is to become completely liberated from Israeli occupation, it is incumbent on the Palestinians to claim sovereignty there and to create real statehood as the first stage of enacting the Palestinian state in all of the declared territories within its borders. In the absence of Israeli control over Gaza, Palestinians must claim sovereignty and must rule there as a State. This is not the end of the struggle and a Palestinian State established first in Gaza does not in any way prevent the Palestinians from working towards the complete fulfillment of their sovereignty in the West Bank and East Jerusalem.

Many Palestinians fear that if they adopt this strategy they will end up with a State in Gaza only. They fear that the international community will forget about the Palestinian issue and that the occupation by Israel of the West Bank will be strengthened. This, in my opinion is highly unlikely. If the sides do not get back to the negotiating table in the framework of the Road Map or in the framework of permanent status negotiations, we are likely to see additional Israeli unilateral disengagements.

If Israel is wise it will return to the negotiating table, however due to the complete absence of trust between the parties, this is unlikely. A peaceful disengagement and a successful Palestinian take over of Gaza will help to build trust between the sides. Perhaps not enough trust to return to permanent status negotiations, but enough to bring about a second, but coordinated disengagement.

It is quite clear that the majority of Israelis and Palestinians perceive the first disengagement as a reward for violence and that Hamas is presenting itself to the public as the party that secured the Israeli evacuation. This was a real lost opportunity by Israel to strengthen the leadership of Abu Mazen. Had Sharon announced the disengagement after meeting with Abu Mazen, it would be perceived as a victory for moderation and negotiations.

A second disengagement must be done in coordination with Abu Mazen directly in the picture. If not, a second disengagement could lead to a third intifada. The next disengagement will likely be from all of the settlements east of the Israeli separation barrier -- walls and fences.

Here we are speaking about a minimum of 80,000 settlers in some 60 settlements. This falls short of what Palestinians want and it will be a clear attempt by Israeli to cement the separation barriers as a permanent border. Nonetheless, the second disengagement should be embraced by the Palestinians and supported in any way possible. The Israeli taboo on removing settlements has been broken by the first disengagement and the Palestinians must encourage the Israelis to continue dismantling more and more settlements.

The best chances for moving forward and for ensuring additional further Israeli withdrawals and disengagements is for the Palestinians to claim statehood and sovereignty and to behave like a state. As a responsible member of the international community, backed by UN Membership, Palestine will be free to enter into international treaties and conventions. Palestine will be free to call upon the United Nations to dispatch United Nations peace keepers to its borders in order to prevent an Israeli incursion into its territory. Palestine can be a free agent and can work on behalf of all of its citizens and territories, even if it still does not have full control over all of the areas of the State. This is all completely feasible and possible if Palestine behaves like a responsible State. This means that Palestine must enforce law and order. It means that there cannot be any militia or unauthorized weapons being used by groups of citizens. It means that stopping the armed struggle or the armed resistance becomes a Palestinian imperative and a supreme matter of Palestinian national strategic interests.

The surest way to advance the process of creating the Palestinian State in all of the West Bank, Gaza and East Jerusalem is for the State of Palestine to exist as a state dedicated to providing security, prosperity and peace for its own citizens. Even if the State of Palestine is not created as part of a negotiated process, a process of coordinated unilateralism is completely possible. In fact, this might be the fastest and surest way to advance the cause of freedom and liberation for Palestine and for Israeli-Palestinian peace.

This article was originally published in AMIN

At 4:46 p. m., Blogger Kantor said...

Hello opensoc,

No, not really. I don´t see the Disengagement as a part of the Road Map, but as an strategic movement of redeployment.

The Wall and the withdrawal are a new design of Israel security in a framework of no Palestinian partnership.

At 6:04 p. m., Anonymous Anónimo said...

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At 6:53 p. m., Anonymous Anónimo said...

No man your wrong , thy call it the Sildenafil case.


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